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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Gleave 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a ] 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY ] 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, ' 
and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ' 
1 CITATION OF 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
\ Case No. 20166 
Case No. 20300 
Consolidated Case 
1 No. 20300 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), U^ah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Respondent Gleave refers the Court to the case of 
Clarkston v. Wright, N.E.2d , (111. 1985). 
That case is so recent that it has r^ ot yet appeared in the 
printed reporters. Therefore, a copyf of the "slip opinion" 
is attached. 
The Clarkston opinion relates to page 19 of 
Gleave1 s opening brief. Specifically, Clarkstort sides," |n%h 
OCT 2 81985 
Cork, Sup-smo Ccurr Hah 
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that evidence of 
failure to wear a seat belt should not be admitted with 
respect to liability or damages. 
Plaintiff also cites the recent case of Wassell v. 
Hamblin, 493 A.2d 870 (Conn. 1985) to similar effect. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Aj day of 
,4/ 
-c 
1985 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys ^£©r Gleave 
By: 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Citation of Supplemental Authority, 
(Gleave vs. Rio Grande), was hand delivered, this J{ 7 day 
of IvCf ' , 1985, to the following: 
E. Scott Savage, Esq. 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
Patrick J. OfHara, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for the Rio Grande and Utah 
Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Paul Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation, State bf Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
^
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S U P R E M E C O U R T 
STATE OF ILLINOIS 
CHAMBERS OF 
J U S T I C E D A N I E L P . W A R D 
R M . 3 0 8 3 , RICHARD J . DALEY CENTER 
CHICAGO 6 0 6 0 2 
October 24, 1985 
Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: Clarkson vs. Wright 
Docket No. 59766 
Dear Mr. DeBry: 
Enclosed is the opinion in Clarkson vs. 
Wright with the correct page 4 inser^ecT 
DPW:nk 
Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
Docket No. 59766-Agenda 18-November 1984, 
LARRY CLARKSON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM WEIGHT, 
Appellee. 
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinioniof the 
court: 
Plaintiff, Larry Clarkson, appealed from the judgment of 
the circuit court of Peoria County entered upon a jury ver-
dict in his favor against defendant, William Wright. The ap-
pellate court affirmed (121 111. App. 3d 230), and we allowed 
plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal (94 Dl. 2d R. 315(a)). 
The facts are adequately set forth in the opinion of the ap-
pellate court and will be stated here only to the extent (neces-
sary to discuss the issues. 
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile owned Iby his 
employer and being driven by plaintiff was struck by defend-
ant's automobile. Plaintiff brought this action seeking dam-
ages for the injuries which he alleged were caused by 
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a 
fractured wrist and serious facial lacerations, and special 
damages of $5,629 for medical expenses of $2,509, and lost 
wages of $3,120. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in 
the amount of $3,620, which was reduced by 50% to $1,810 
based upon the jury's determination of the parties' compara-
tive negligence. 
Plaintiff contends that because defendant failed tol prove 
that the seat belt in the automobile was in working order 
and available for use the circuit court erred in admitting evi-
dence of plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt. He arguis that 
the "present Illinois rule that the seat belt defense can be 
considered in mitigation of damages is unsound." (See 
Mvunt v. McClellan (1968), 91 Dl. App. 2d 1.) Plaintiff and 
amicus curiae, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, argue 
too that, with the adoption of comparative negligence, evi-
dence of the failure to use a seat belt will result in a double 
reduction of damages because juries will consider it both in 
their comparative-negligence deliberations and will further 
reduce damages to the extent which they determine |use of 
the seat belt would have prevented. 
Defendant contends that "consistent with principles of 
equitable distribution and apportionment of loss," evidence 
of plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt requires a reduction in 
his damages where the failure to use a seat belt has resulted 
in additional or enhanced injuries. Defendant argues that the 
"overwhelming recognition of the efficacy of seat b#ts by 
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both the scientific community and the courts of sistet States 
supports the consideration of plaintiffs failure to wear an 
available seat belt to reduce recoverable damages." [Amicus 
curiae, the Illinois Defense Counsel, argues that a plaintiff is 
under a duty to exercise ordinary care for his saiety and 
that this "duty extends to the utilization of restraints to 
avert or mitigate against the consequences of vehicular colli-
sions." Defendant contends too that plaintiffs failure to use 
a seat belt was properly admissible both on the issue of com-
parative negligence and plaintiffs failure to mitigate dam-
ages under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, but more 
appropriately should be considered on the issue of liability. 
The question whether failure to use a seat belt may be 
shown in automobile personal injury litigation either as evi-
dence of contributory negligence or as failure to mitigate 
damages has been the subject of much controversy. See, e.g., 
Annot, Nonu8e of Automobile Seatbelts as EvidencelofCom-
parative Negligence, 95 A.L.R. 3d 239 (1979); Annot, Auto-
mobile Occupant's Failure to Use Seat Belt as Corttributory 
Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979); Annot, N(muse\ofSeat 
Belt as Failure to Mitigate Damages, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1033 
(1977); Snyder, The Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 Marq. 
L. Rev. 211 (1969-70); Heist, The Seat Belt Defehse-An 
Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings LJ. 613 (196^-67); J. 
Stein, Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death 
Actions sec. 127 (1972); 2 M. Bender, The Seat Belt defense, 
Damages in Tbrt Actions sec. 16.40 et seq. (1984). 
Although this court has not previously considered the is-
sue, the appellate court has done so on a number of occa-
sions. The rule as stated in the opinions of the appellate 
court is that the trier of fact may not consider the failure to 
use seat belts on the issue of liability (Josel v. Rossi (1972), 7 
SI. App. 3d 1091), but may be instructed with respect to the 
failure to use seat belts on the issue of damages if there is 
competent evidence to show a causal connection between 
the plaintiffs failure to use an available belt and the injuries 
and damages sustained. (Eichorn v. Olson (1975), 32 Bl. 
App. 3d 587.) Prosser describes the relationship between 
plaintiff's negligence and his duty to mitigate damages as 
follows: 
"Closely allied to the doctrine of contributor^ negli-
gence is the rule of 'avoidable consequences/ whicn denies 
recovery for any damages which could have been avoided 
by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Both 
rest upon the same fundamental policy of making recovery 
depend upon the plaintiffs proper care for the protection 
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of his own interests, and both require of him obly the 
standard of the reasonable man under the circumstances." 
Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 422-23 (4th ed. 1971). 
We fail to perceive the value of attempting to ahalyze, 
compare or reconcile the many decisions reviewed in the 
authorities cited. We agree with the majority view that 
failure to use a seat belt was not negligence or contribu-
tory negligence which caused the accident out of 
plaintiffs injuries arose. At most, the failure to use 
belt created a condition which possibly may h^ve in 
creased the severity of plaintiff's injuries. 
which 
a seat 
Section 12-603 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (II Rev. 
Stat. 1979, ch. 95V2, par. 12-603) required the installa-
tion of two sets of seat belts in the front seat of all auto-
mobiles manufactured after 1964 and prohibited any per-
son from operating an automobile manufactured after 
1960 which is not so equipped. The statute contained no 
requirement that seat belts be used until the enactment of 
Public Act 83-1507 ("An Act to add Section 12-603.1 to 
The Illinois Vehicle Code,' " approved January 8 1985, 
effective July 1, 1985), which in pertinent part, provides: 
"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor 
vehicle operated on a street or highway in this Stake shall 
wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safeiy belt; 
(d) A violation of this Section shall be a petty pffense 
and subject to a fine not to exceed $25." 
Once plaintiff suffered an injury there was, of Course, 
a duty to mitigate the damages in any reasonable way 
possible. That duty to mitigate damages which arose sub-
sequent to the injury is, however, clearly distinguishable 
from any duty which existed prior to the injury. Here, 
there was no statutory duty to wear a seat belt and the 
presence of the seat belt in the automobile did not create 
the duty to wear it any more than would the presence in 
the automobile of a protective helmet create a duty to 
wear that. We find no authority wrhich imposed on plaintiff 
the duty to anticipate and guard against defendants neg-
ligence. 
We conclude that the rule, followed in a majority of the 
jurisdictions which have considered the question (see 
Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for 
the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 
56 Notre Dame Law. 272, 273, n.9 (1980)), that evidence 
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of failure to wear a seat belt should not be admitted with 
respect to either the question of liability or damages, is a 
sound one which should be followed in this jurisdiction 
We note that during the pendency of this appeal the 
General Assembly enacted Public Act 83—1507, which, 
consistent with our holding here, contains the following 
provision: 
"(c) Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this 
Section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, 
shall not limit the liability of an insurer, and shall not di-
minish any recovery for damages arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle." |Pub. 
Act 83-1507, approved Jan. 8, 1985, eff. July 1, 1985. 
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate 
and circuit courts are reversed and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court of Peoria County for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgments revetsed; 
cause remanded. 
JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: 
I believe that the plaintiff's failure to use a seat b&t is 
evidence that the jury may properly consider in determin-
ing the amount of plaintiffs damages. I, therefore] dis-
sent. 
This State has recently adopted the pure form of [com-
parative negligence. Therefore, in considering the peat-
belt defense it is not appropriate to think in terms of con-
tributory negligence, that is, conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff which will defeat recovery. Under comparative 
negligence, we must consider plaintiffs failure to u^e an 
available seat belt in terms of reducing the amount df the 
plaintiff's damages. Some discuss plaintiffs duty in such 
situations in terms of ''mitigation of damages'' or "avoid-
able consequences/' We need not try to classify plaintiffs 
duty. We should simply hold that plaintiffs recovery may 
be diminished to the extent that his failure to use an Avail-
able seat belt contributed to his injuries. 
States adhering to the contributory-negligence theory 
have generally been unwilling to hold that plaintiffs fail-
ure to use a seat belt bars recovery. However, one com-
mentator has stated: 'There is a growing body of case 
authority and scholarly comment which indicates that al-
though evidence of a failure to fasten a seat belt is inad-
missible to show contributory negligence, such evidence 
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should be admissible under a comparative negligence [stand-
ard/' Miller, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Neg-
ligence, 12 Idaho L. Rev. 59, 60 (1975). 
Also, another commentator stated: 
"Jurisdictions employing the standard of comparative 
negligence need not engage m any flights of intel ectual 
fantasy to use the seat belt rule as a mechanism to assure 
the proper apportionment of damage recoveries. By its 
very nature, the concept of comparative negligence con-
templates the inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at 
the appropriate amount of damages to be recovered by 
each of the claimants It must be concluded, therefore, that 
the advent of the comparative negligence standard, when 
coupled with the refined version of the reasonably prudent 
person standard, will meluctably lead to the adoption of 
the seat belt rule as a significant element of the damage 
apportionment equation/' Hoglund and Parsons, Caveat 
Viator The Duty To Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative 
Negligence Law, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1974) 
In Alms v Ribar (1981), 85 111. 2d 1, this State, by 
judicial decision, abandoned the defense of contributory 
negligence and adopted the principle of pure comparative 
negligence. In doing so, this court made these statements: 
"Under a comparative negligence standard, the parties are 
allowed to recover the proportion of damages not attribut-
able to their own fault The basic logic and fairness of such 
apportionment is difficult to dispute." (Emphasis apded.) 
(85 111 2d 1, 16.) 
"[W]e believe that the need to deter negligent parties sup-
ports the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine 
in which each party would be liable for damages in \direct 
proportion to his degree of carelessness " (Emphasis 
added.) (85 111. 2d 1,18.) 
4The 'pure' form of comparative negligence is thb only 
system which truly apportions damages according \to the 
relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves tot^l jus-
tice " (Emphasis added.) (85 111. 2d 1, 27.) 
Thus, the principle underlying pure comparative Inegli-
gence, as adopted in Alvis, is fairness. Damages are ap-
portioned according to the relative fault of the parties 
The parties are permitted to recover damages "not attrib-
utable to their own fault1' (Emphasis added.) 85 111. 12d 1, 
16. 
It therefore appears that, to be consistent with our 
holding in Alms, a plaintiff should not be permitted \o re-
cover damages brought about by his failure to wear a seat 
belt if a reasonably prudent person would be expectjed to 
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use a seat belt under similar circumstances. 
The majority opinion notes that the act in effect jat the 
time of the accident only required that automobiles be 
equipped with seat belts and contained no requirement 
that seat belts be used by the occupants. (111. Rev. Stat. 
1979, ch. 95V2, par. 12-603.) If the statute would have 
required the use of seat belts as it now does, that would 
have been a reason to consider whether the plaintiff s fail-
ure to use the seat belt constituted negligence per se. 
Such a statute imposes a duty on the passenger to use the 
seat belt. (See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense—State\of the 
Law, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 172, 174 (1970).) The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin, in Bentzler v. Braun (1967), 34 Wis. 
2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, considered the Wisconsin statute 
which only required that automobiles be equipped with 
seat belts and did not require the passengers to use Ithem. 
The court stated: 
"While we agree with those courts that have concluded 
that it is not negligent per se to fail to use seat belts where 
the only statutory standard is one that requires the instal-
lation of the seat belts in the vehicle, we nevertheless con-
clude that there is a duty, based on the common-law stand-
ard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts 
independent of any statutory mandate." (34 Wis. 3d 362, 
385, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 639.) 
Thus, the fact that there was no statutory duty to ^vear a 
seat belt (which is noted in the majority opinion) did not 
relieve the plaintiff of a common law duty to use ordinary 
care. If a reasonably prudent person, under similar cir-
cumstances, would have used the available seat belt?, then 
the plaintiff had a duty to do so. 
The majority opinion states that the duty to mitigate 
damages applies only to those damages which arise after 
the injury. Under comparative negligence we have aban-
doned the rigid doctrines associated with contributory 
negligence and the fine lines of demarcation surrounding 
such doctrines. We should not attempt to continue to ap-
ply the same rigid limitations of those concepts designed 
to avoid the harshness of contributory negligence when 
applying the same principles under comparative negli-
gence. The "avoidable consequences'* or "mitigation of 
damages'' principles referred to in the majority opinion 
were doctrines applied in jurisdictions where plaintiffs 
contributory negligence was a complete defense to enable 
the courts to equitably separate damages attributable to 
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the plaintiffs conduct without completely defeating the 
plaintiffs claim against the defendant. Under compara-
tive negligence there is no longer a need or reason to de-
fine artificial lines or times beyond which the court cannot 
consider the doctrines of avoidable consequences or miti-
gation of damages as a means of equitably apportioning 
damages. 
Dean Prosser, in discussing whether plaintiffs prein-
jury conduct which did not cause the accident can be con-
sidered in assessing damages, notes that "Iowa and Kan-
sas *** have apportioned the damages, holding that the 
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced to the exteni that [the 
plaintiffs injuries] have been aggravated by his own ante-
cedent negligence." Prosser continues, "This would seem 
to be the better view, unless we are to place an entirely 
artificial emphasis upon the moment of impactL and the 
pure mechanics of causation." (Emphasis added.) 
(Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 424 (4th ed. 1971).)Iij support 
of this proposition, Dean Prosser states: "This has been 
applied where plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt has not 
caused the collision, but has contributed to the damages 
from it." Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 424 n.75 (4th e[d. 1971). 
The majority opinion is correct in noting that the ques-
tion we are now considering has been the subjeci of much 
controversy. I am not as sure as is the majority opinion 
that the conclusion it has reached represents the majority 
view in this country, especially in pure comparative-negli-
gence jurisdictions. Some courts that have rejected the 
seat-belt defense were in jurisdictions wherein contribu-
tory negligence was a defense. Some were in jurisdictions 
that applied a modified form of comparative negligence. 
In some cases the defense was rejected because of the 
manner in which it was raised or pleaded. See Kircher, 
The Seat Belt Defense—State of the Law, 53 Marq[ L. Rev. 
172 (1970). 
Regardless of where the numerical majority ofljurisdic-
tions may stand on the issue, we must not lose sight of the 
fact that we have only recently, in Alvis, abandoned the 
artificially harsh doctrine of contributory negligence. We 
have adopted in its stead the principle of pure compara-
tive negligence based on the equitable and fair Rationale 
that a party should recover for the damages caused by the 
other party and should not recover for the damages he 
himself has caused. We should not now adopt exceptions 
to our new doctrine of comparative negligence which will 
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make it a little less than "pure." Principles of law have a 
way of collecting exceptions to accommodate special inter-
ests. I view the majority opinion as an exception to our 
new doctrine which permits the plaintiff to recover more 
than he otherwise would be entitled to under the rationale 
behind the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. If, 
under the facts and circumstances of the case, a reasona-
bly prudent person would have used the available seat belt 
in the automobile, and if the plaintiff received more se-
vere injuries from the accident as a result of not wearing 
the seat belt, this is information the jury has| a right to 
consider in assessing damages. 
The majority opinion refers to the fact thatlPublic Act 
83-1507, effective July 1, 1985, provides thai failure to 
wear a seat safety belt in violation of the statute shall not 
be considered evidence of negligence and shall not dimin-
ish any recovery for damages. The majority opinion notes 
that this statutory provision is consistent with the holding 
of this opinion. We have not as yet passed on the constitu-
tionality of Public Act 83—1507. It would appear that the 
provision just referred to is inconsistent with an earlier 
provision of the Act which requires each driver and front-
seat passenger of a motor vehicle to wear a properly ad-
justed and fastened seat safety belt and makes it a petty 
offense not to do so. Thus the legislature, in the Act, has 
said that it is dangerous for a passenger in an automobile 
not to wear a seat belt; therefore, the law requires that 
front-seat passengers wear seat belts or they will be fined 
for not doing so. However, if such a passenger is injured 
in an accident caused by another, the amount of damages 
caused by his failure to wear a seat belt (although he may 
be fined) cannot be deducted from his total recovery. The 
Act creates a duty on specified passengers to wear seat 
belts and enforces that duty by providing a fine for the 
violation. Consistency would seem to require that, in con-
sidering the question of damages, a violation of this statu-
tory duty should at least be considered as evidence of 
plaintiff's failure to act as a reasonably prudent person. 
Inferentially, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Bentzler 
v. Braun, considered that failure to use available seat 
belts, when the statute by its terms requires their use, 
may be negligence per se. (See also Kircher, The Seat Belt 
Defense-State of the Law, 53 Marq. 172, 174 (1970).) In 
Spier v. Barker (1974), 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, the New York Court of Appeals noted 
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that the statute of that State does not require passengers 
of automobiles to wear seat belts. Therefore, plaintiffs 
failure to do so would not be considered by the court to be 
negligence per se. However, relying on section 65 of 
Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971), which I referred to above, 
the New York court held that the jury could consider 
plaintiffs nonuse of a seat belt in assessing damages. The 
language of Public Act 83—1507, which provides tnat the 
failure to wear a seat safety belt shall not be considered 
evidence of negligence, is similar to that found in statutes 
requiring seat-belt installation but not their use that have 
been enacted in Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee, and 
Virginia. See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense—Statue of the 
Law, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 172, 176 (1970). 
For the above reasons, I dissent from the opinion of 
the majority of this court. 
JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent. 
JUSTICE MILLER, also dissenting: 
I join in Justice Ryan's dissent insofar as th4 dissent 
relates to accidents which occurred subsequent to the ef-
fective date of this court's holding in Alvis v. Ribar 
(1981), 85 111. 2d 1. Because the questions have not been 
presented, I would express no opinion at this time with 
regard to the constitutionality of Public Act 834-1507 or 
its effect on the views expressed in Justice Ryan^ dissent. 
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